make a huge difference to a nascent career. They are risky, of course, yet they are important and give one the freedom to follow new ideas and take some chances. Now, of course, I wish there were more such awards for mid-career scientists! What was your favorite conference? 'Evolution -The Molecular Landscape', a Cold Spring Harbor Symposium celebrating the Darwin bicentenary. It lasted six days, and the talks often went to 11p.m.; it was exhausting, presentations were all firstrate, but best were the interactions before, between and after the sessions. And, it was an energizing mix of disciplines from paleontology to the origins of life to evolutionary genetics and philosophy. The lobster dinner wasn't bad either.
What is your favorite book?
It is hard, no impossible, to name one favorite. But, I recently read Francis Crick: Discoverer of the Genetic Code by Matt Ridley on a trans-Atlantic flight. It read, as one reviewer put it, "like a guilty pleasure." It was intriguing to learn more about the man behind the science.
Where is evolutionary biology heading? Evolutionary biology is in large part about reconstructing the past. One of the things I am excited about is our increasing ability to do just that with true genetic precision. For example, by identifying mutations that affect phenotypes, we can start to reconstruct traits of extinct species. Already, using phylogenetic methods, we can reconstruct ancient opsin-gene sequences to learn about dinosaur vision. Using ancient DNA, we now know some Neanderthals were redheaded, and some mammoths were blonde. Now imagine reconstructing or sequencing whole genomes and being able to predict the morphology, physiology or even behavior of ancient creatures! To what extent this will be possible is still unclear, but if we have reliable data, we can properly understand the direction and nature of evolutionary change in an unprecedented way. That, surely, is the ultimate goal of our field. the 20 th century? Primarily due to George C. Williams' trenchant critique; also influential was the work of John Maynard Smith. They argued that group selection was theoretically possible but unlikely to be a major evolutionary force, and was not needed to explain the known biological phenomena anyway. Also, they stressed the fallacy of assuming that selection on individual organisms would automatically lead to outcomes that benefit the group. This fallacy was surprisingly common in mid-20 th century biology and is still encountered today. The rise of 'kin selection' also contributed to the demise of group selection. Biologists such as Richard Dawkins and John Maynard Smith argued that kin selection or inclusive fitness theory, first articulated by William D. Hamilton in the 1960s, provided a better explanation of phenomena such as altruism which had traditionally been taken as evidence for group selection. However, the true relation between kin and group selection is a controversial matter. Many modern theorists argue that suitably understood they are in fact equivalent, so do not constitute alternative scientific hypotheses at all.
But isn't the gene the real unit of selection?
Dawkins originally presented his 'selfish gene' idea as an empirical alternative to individual and group-level selection, but later realised the error of his ways. Almost any selection process, at any level, will ultimately lead to a change in gene frequencies, so can be described as a process in which one gene spreads at the expense of its alleles. Thus, it is generally wrong to contrast 'gene selection' with either individual or group selection -there is no empirical issue at stake here. This was the point that Dawkins later captured with his 'replicator-vehicle' distinction; others have marked it by contrasting units and levels of selection. In recent literature, 'gene-level selection' is often used in a restricted sense, to mean selection between genes within a single organism, as occurs in cases of intra-genomic conflict, e.g. meiotic drive. In this sense, most selection processes cannot be described as gene selection.
Levels of selection Samir Okasha
What is the 'levels of selection' question about? It's about the level of the biological hierarchy at which natural selection acts, e.g. individual, group, gene, community, species, etc. Usually when we think about selection, we think of it acting at the level of the individual organism, favouring the fittest individuals over the less fit and thus leading to evolutionary change. But individual-level selection is only one possibility among many. For the key requirements of evolution by natural selection -variation, associated differences in fitness and heritability -can in principle be met by entities at many levels, above and below that of the individual organism. For example, a selective process could quite easily operate on groups of organisms, favouring some types of groups over others. This idea is known as 'group selection'.
What is the origin of the levels of selection debate? Like much in evolutionary biology, it traces back to Darwin. Though Darwin primarily discussed individual-level selection, he was aware of other possibilities. In The Descent of Man (1879), he tackled the problem of how self-sacrificial and other 'altruistic' behaviours could have evolved in early hominids. As such behaviours reduce an individual's fitness, it is clear that they cannot have evolved by selection at the individual level. Darwin suggested that group selection may be the answer. Groups in which altruistic behaviour was prevalent may have enjoyed a selective advantage over groups in which it was absent, he argued. Another early evolutionist who discussed the levels question was August Weismann, mainly in relation to selection at the sub-organismic level. However, the modern debate only really took off in the 1960s with the rise of social evolution theory, and the ensuing controversy over group selection.
Why did 'group selection' become such a chequered concept in

Quick guide
How does the levels of selection question relate to the 'major evolutionary transitions'? Such transitions, as defined by Eörs Szathmáry and John Maynard Smith, occur when free-living biological units, capable of surviving and reproducing alone, coalesce into a single larger unit, giving rise to a new, higher-level individual -for example, in the evolution of multicelled organisms from single-celled ancestors. In transitions of this sort, there is the potential for selection to act on both the smaller and the larger units -the individuals and the groups. For the groups to evolve into 'real' individuals, i.e. integrated cohesive units, group-level selection must trump individuallevel selection. So multiple levels of selection are intimately involved with evolutionary transitions.
What about species selection?
This was an idea defended by Stephen J. Gould and other macroevolutionists, which says that selection may operate on whole species over geological time, favouring those species best able to survive or reproduce (i.e. speciate). This could explain why certain types of species, e.g. ecological specialists, become more common than others, e.g. generalists, in a given clade, and thus indirectly help explain long-term evolutionary trends. Species selection is certainly a logical possibility, but it is difficult to assess how important an evolutionary process it has been.
Where can I find out more?
neurobiology. In the first application of this approach, children with autism, which have profound impairments in theory of mind and social interactions, were found to make stereotypical judgments based on race and gender, just like typical children [5] . Here, we used the same task [5] (see Supplemental information available online with this issue) to investigate racial and gender stereotyping ( Figure 1A ) in a group of twenty children with WS (10 female and 10 male) aged 7 to 16 years (M = 12.9; SD = 2.8), and twenty control children aged 5 to 15 years (M = 7.0; SD = 1.8), individually matched to WS participants on gender (10 female and 10 male) and mental age (F (1, 38) = 2.97, p > 0.09). As a group, the participants with WS had IQs within the usual range for this condition, but contained a proportion of high-performing, normal IQ subjects.
Confirming previous work, the control children showed strong pro-Caucasian bias (X 2 (1,19) = 60.33, p < 0.001). In contrast, no evidence of race bias was found with the WS children ( Figure 1B) , whose scores were not statistically different from 50% (X 2 (1,19) = 28.0, p > 0.05), indicating that they attributed positive and negative features equally to Caucasian (in-group) and non-Caucasian (out-group) characters. Conversely, sex-role bias was pronounced and identical in the two groups (p > 0.99), indicating that absent racial stereotypes were not due to an overall feature attribution impairment. Chronological age differences between the WS and the control groups, or intellectual difficulties in WS children were unrelated to these findings (see Supplemental information).
To our knowledge, this is the first indication of the absence of racial stereotyping in a human group. While it is possible in principle that children with WS were differentially exposed to other ethnicities, this is unlikely as they were recruited from similar social backgrounds, and stereotypes emerge in normally developing children without such exposure [1] . Our results therefore indicate that it was WS that had dissociable effects on gender and race bias, suggesting differential neurobehavioral mechanisms for the development and/or maintenance of these stereotype categories.
As [2] , making an understanding of the origin of stereotypes an important scientific and socio-political topic. An important process invoked by out-groups is social fear [3] . A unique opportunity to study the contribution of this mechanism to stereotypes is afforded by individuals with the microdeletion disorder Williams syndrome (WS), in which social fear is absent, leading to an unusually friendly, high approachability behaviour, including towards strangers [4] . Here we show that children with WS lack racial stereotyping, though they retain gender stereotyping, compared to matched typically developing children. Our data indicate that mechanisms for the emergence of gender versus racial bias are neurogenetically dissociable. Specifically, because WS is associated with reduced social fear, our data support a role of social fear processing in the emergence of racial, but not gender, stereotyping.
A variety of cognitive, social/ behavioural and emotive processes could in principle contribute to stereotyping. The study of populations with clear impairments in these functions can therefore provide information about the underlying Correspondence
